After four installments, the in-depth analysis of Yacyretá paints a clear picture: it is a strategic power plant with 3,200 MW of installed capacity and annual production of nearly 20,000 GWh, but it remains trapped in an unfinished financial framework.

The first three installments examined the Yacyretá Binational Entity as a strategic, binational project: its origins in 1973, its partial operation through 2011, the tariff disparities, and the technical and environmental impact of a dam that has yet to reach its full design capacity. With 3,200 MW of installed capacity and millions in cross-debts, the project remains incomplete. In this installment, we address the core of the problem: the financial maze that determines its future.

Today, with 20 generating units, Yacyretá produces approximately 20,000 GWh annually, meeting 15–20% of Argentina’s electricity demand and a significant portion of Paraguay’s. From a hydrological standpoint, the Paraná River has an average flow of 14,000 m³/s, with peaks of 50,000 m³/s during floods.

The project to build a hydroelectric dam emerged in the 1970s in response to growing energy demand in the Southern Cone. The Yacyretá Treaty, signed in 1973 by Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner and Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón, established EBY as an autonomous entity to build and operate the dam.

Yacyretá is once again at the center of the regional strategic debate. More than three decades after its partial commissioning, the binational dam on the Paraná River continues to operate with unfinished construction, pending decisions, and unresolved financial and political tensions between Paraguay and Argentina. Conceived as one of the most ambitious hydroelectric projects in Latin America, the plant today bears the consequences of a history marked by delays, technical disagreements, environmental disputes, and a complex web of debts.